What’s the best way to match new doctors to medical residency programs? The medical residency matching problem is solved by a centralized coordination system that pairs market participants according to their preferences. This paper examines the evidence for the claim that the matching system depresses salaries and finds that an alternative explanation – low salaries represent an implicit tuition fee for medical training – is more promising.
We report on research that concerns the efficacy of health care markets and the health of the population. This includes:
The functioning of health insurance markets
The impact of incentive mechanisms for the provision and quality of health care services by physicians and hospitals.
The functioning of markets for pharmaceuticals and medical devices
The interaction between health outcomes and economic behavior, and the effect of policy levers in changing them.
NHS hospitals in England are rarely closed in constituencies where the governing party has a slender majority. This means that for near random reasons, those areas have more competition in healthcare – which has allowed the authors to assess its impact on management quality and clinical performance.