Does greater regulation of consumer financial products actually benefit consumers? This research, analyzing the CARD act enacted in the U.S. in 2009, suggests that it does. In particular, the act’s restrictions on hidden credit card fees were found to reduce borrowing costs (especially for consumers with low credit scores) without increasing interest charges and other fees and without reducing access to credit.
Organisation of Markets
We focus on research that concerns antitrust policy, economic regulation, and market design. Questions of interest include the following:
How should we regulate horizontal and/or vertical mergers? Is there a trade-off between short run market power and longer run investment incentives?
How should we respond to departures from the competitive ideal in markets; with imperfect information, that are highly concentrated, that are natural monopolies, or that generate externalities resulting from knowledge producing activities?
How should centralized markets (like health insurance exchanges, kidney exchanges, and school choice mechanisms) be organized?
What is the optimal design of auctions to procure services for the government, such as highway construction contracts, or to sell government assets, such as spectrum or mineral rights?
How can policy makers detect and deter collusion?
How should patent policy be designed?
